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Abstract 
 
Taking its cue from Deleuze’s reading of Foucault’s notion of apparatus (dispositif), this article explores the 
assemblage of mechanisms, institutions, discourses and practices that came to be conceptualized as a “smart 
border.” Through an examination of Canadian policy documents, this article analyses the smart border as a 
“diffuse border.” Physically extending beyond and inside its geopolitical location through a set of legal, 
administrative and technological procedures such as refugee containment, counter-terrorism measures and 
information-sharing, the border thus articulates fluid control measures based on the use of information 
technologies to more restrictive procedures such as confinement. As a lack of transparency and racialized 
assessments of dangerousness often characterize its operations, the smart border apparatus calls for an 
analysis of the ways in which it contributes to the building of an “intelligence paradigm” through which the 
securitization of the region is undertaken.   
 
 
 
Non pas prédire, mais être attentif à l'inconnu qui frappe à la porte.2 
Gilles Deleuze, Qu’est-ce qu’un dispositif? 
 
 
Signed between Canada and the United States in December, 2001 and accompanied by a 
32-point action plan, the Smart Border Declaration commits North American border 
management agencies to combat “terrorist activity” and ensure “public and economic 
security.” Under the title Building a Smart Border for the 21st Century on the Foundation 
of a North American Zone of Confidence, the declaration articulates several measures 
deemed to securitize the border, often studied separately in the Canadian context: anti-
terrorism legislation (Daniels et al. 2001), exchange of information on migrants and 
travelers by intelligence and security agencies (ICLMG 2004), biometrics (Zureik 2004), 
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technologically-enhanced identity cards (Lyon and Stalder 2003) such as permanent 
resident identification (Browne 2005), preclearance programmes (Sparke 2004) and, a 
variety of refugee interdiction measures (Crépeau and Tremblay 2003). After the 
expansion in March 2005 of the “zone of confidence” to a Security and Prosperity 
Partnership of North America including Mexico, “smart and secure borders” continue to 
be seen as a matter of high priority on the agendas of both Canada and the United States 
(Office of the Prime Minister 2006).   
 
Through an examination of Canadian policy documents, the smart border offers an 
interesting case study of some of the manifold efforts deployed by Western countries to 
simultaneously deborder and reborder (Rumford 2006) their territories. In the case of the 
smart border, this process refers to the extension of the border into a multiplicity of sites 
for the surveillance of movement. The discourses and practices of security stemming from 
the smart border endeavour may appear familiar to specialists of contemporary border 
control as they seem to share elements with studies of European border management and, 
to a lesser extent, the securitization of the Mexico-United States border.3 In contrast to 
these instances, the Canada-United States border is not crossed by tens of thousands of 
undocumented migrants each year; it is not militarized as is its United States-Mexico 
counterpart, nor has it been abolished, as is the case for a number of internal European 
borders. Yet, in the wake of the “war on terror,” the Canada-United States border has 
come to assume increased importance as a locus of security in North America. The smart 
border emerged as a response to a series of events following what is now conveniently 
designated as 9/11, a context which has had a profound impact upon the re-engineering of 
border management in the region. Indeed, intended to carry on with the promotion of free 
trade, a heritage of the past two decades, the smart border is also considered to represent 
an integral part of the anti-terrorism endeavour through which both countries have agreed 
to bring the “war on terror” home.   
 
This article attempts at critically reflecting upon the transformations in the space covered 
by the border, and upon their implications. By focusing on the inner workings of the smart 
border, I hope to provide an entry into the logics at work in the securitization of the 
region. Obviously, other entries are possible, as the smart border is one of various security 
apparatuses deployed in the area. However, given the breadth of securitization strategies 
referred to in the Declaration, the smart border apparatus constitutes an interesting 
starting point for an exploration of the North American machinery of security. 
 
 
What space for which kind of border?  
 
How can we conceptualize the space designated by the Declaration as the “smart border”? 
I have elsewhere argued that the securitization of this space provided the border with a 
new role, that of a “social filter” of legitimated (low risk) and illegitimated (high risk) 
mobilities (Côté-Boucher 2005), a filtering process tantamount to Lyon’s (2003b) notion 
                                                     
3  For instance, see the series ‘Theorizing Borders’ published by the European Journal of Social Theory in 
2006, 9, (2), or “The Last Frontier: The Contemporary Configuration of the U.S.-Mexico Border’ in 2006 
by the South Atlantic Quarterly, 105 (4). 
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of “social sorting” via surveillance practices. This article starts from another premise, as it 
attempts theorizing the assemblage of mechanisms, institutions, discourses and practices 
that came to be conceptualized as a “smart border.” In doing so, it especially pays 
attention to the ways in which this assemblage extends the space covered by the border, as 
well as the consequences of this expansion.   
 
A programme for a diffuse border  
The Smart Border Declaration, the logic of which was further elaborated under the 
Security and Prosperity Partnership, resembles what Foucault terms a “programme.” That 
is, paraphrasing Foucault, this document contains a set of prescriptions about how to 
organize border institutions by networking them, outlines the method for designing the 
space covered by the border through its diffusion and, by the same token, offers a variety 
of instructions regarding how this space should regulate subjectivities and discipline 
conduct (2001 [1978]).4  In short, the programme represents a blueprint for the 
management of the border, with a set of proposed strategies for achieving explicit goals. 
The signatories planned to rely on already existing mechanisms (e.g. visa requirements), 
to adopt a number of novel technologies and documents (e.g. biometrics and 
computerized permanent resident cards) and to reorganize institutions (for instance, the 
creation of the CBSA, the Canada Border Services Agency) with the objective of 
securitizing the region through the space of the border. They also establish a domain of 
objects characterized by their mobility (commodities, refugees, business travelers, etc.) 
and require their evaluation in terms of the level of threat they are considered to represent. 
In this sense, the Declaration, accompanied by its action plan, could be more specifically 
labelled as a programme of government of movement. Yet, the various strategies proposed 
by the programme may not all be coherent; in fact, they can be superposed, opposed or 
even abandoned after some years. In the uncertain process leading to their 
implementation, strategies produce effects, some of them unintended, yet always 
concrete; this is what Foucault points to as the “solidity and suppleness” of the 
“apparatus” (dispositif). That is, in the relationship of this multiplicity of effects to the 
programme, we are provided access to the rationality—the arrangement of rules and the 
set of truth statements regarding a domain of objects—at stake in a given moment and 
space (2001 [1978]).    
 
In fact, the apparatus of the smart border rearranges the border by extending it beyond 
North America for the containment of a series of movements it designates as threatening 
(e.g. refugees, undocumented migrants) while facilitating other types of mobilities (e.g. 
business travelers). Yet, going beyond the government of movement, the smart border is 
also extended inside its geopolitical location for the surveillance of citizens and non-
citizens intelligence agencies consider to be potential “terrorists.” It is these extensions 
that I designate as a “diffuse border,” that is a nebulous entity for the monitoring of 
mobilities, as well as the management of perceived threat, outside, inside and on the 
geopolitical border shared by Canada and the United States. As a result, the diffuse smart 
                                                     
4 This article emphasizes the first two aspects.  For the formation and regulation of anxious subjectivities, 
please see ibid. chapter 3. 
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border constitutes a peculiar apparatus of security, one which significantly alters the 
“territorialization of government,” that is the ways in which it marks out the limits of its 
exercise, bounds its exclusions, re-defines “who or what can rightfully enter” (Rose 1999: 
34) as well as who may exit with the protections granted by citizenship.   
 
An apparatus for speaking and seeing  
An inspired interpreter of Foucault, whom he sees as a cartographer (2004 [1984]), 
Deleuze insists on analyzing the politics of visibility and enunciability deployed by 
apparatuses. That is, Deleuze defines the apparatus as a tangle of moving lines; this 
multilinear ensemble turns certain elements into observable objects, renders enunciations 
true (or false) while permitting the historical deployment of forces in the formation of 
various subjectivities. Accordingly, the apparatus is a machine that renders visible and 
generates speech, “une machine à faire voir et à faire parler” (Deleuze 1989: 186). 
Untangling these moving lines of visibility and enunciation requires a mapping of the 
apparatus through an analysis of the objects, statements, forces and subjects which 
circulate in its power field. By the same token, it can be added to Deleuze’s theorizing 
that the apparatus renders particular objects invisible and certain statements unthinkable 
in the rationality specific to an apparatus.  It is probably in this sense that Foucault 
affirms, in his archaeological period: “…on ne peut pas parler à n'importe quelle époque 
de n'importe quoi” (1969: 61).5   
 
As demonstrated by the confessionary aspect of the inspection upon arrival at a port of 
entry (Salter 2006), border apparatuses deploy spaces for examining and interrogating 
travelers, emphasizing gaze and inciting speech as means of surveillance. But, as Bigo 
suggests regarding “the professionals in charge of the management of risk and fear” 
(2002: 63), contemporary border control also grants security agencies with great 
legitimacy in the definition of danger, in the assessment of the level of threat and in 
providing “solutions” to those dangers; in short, in the designation of what is to be seen 
and inquired, as well as what should be said and done about it.  Consequently, these 
agencies have appropriated the “serious discourse” (Foucault 1969) about security, 
delimiting the statements which function within the smart border apparatus (e.g., “the 
border is porous”; “the refugee protection system is flawed”; “terrorism threatens public 
and economic security”) and thus discursively produce their objects (e.g. “the terrorist”, 
“the bogus refugee” or “the trusted traveler”).6 Essentially, the smart border designates as 
well as frames what in particular can be seen and enunciated. By extension, this 
apparatus leaves out, unexamined and unattended, other dimensions it considers 
irrelevant, for instance the human rights to which the surveyed individuals are entitled, or 
an approach contemplating the Cold War underpinnings of the rise of political Islam in 
mainstream politics in Muslim majority societies (Mamdani 2004).  
 
 
                                                     
5 ‘One cannot speak of absolutely anything at any given epoch’. 
6 Compare, for instance, to the following statement and object pertaining to another historical discursive 
formation: ‘Communism is a threat to the free world’ therefore ‘Vietnamese refugees are in need of 
protection’. 
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Control?  
 
Walters (2006) invites us to examine the current security arrangements shaping Western 
borders through an analytics of “control,” which is interested in the transformations 
affecting the spatiality, mechanisms and subjects of power in contemporary societies. As 
they give rise smoother power relations, border spaces are characterized by fluid 
communications in order to survey mobilities. Indeed, for Deleuze (1990), control 
replaces the former carceral archipelago relying on enclosed disciplinary sites for 
effecting surveillance. In contrast to discipline, control rests upon an open-ended space 
characterized by the modulations produced by a never-ending, continuous and 
instantaneous flow of data exchange in networks accessible via passwords. Consequently, 
the surveillance exercised through means of control is extending, diffusing and 
networking the spaces on which it operates.   
 
The analysis of the mechanisms of the smart border apparatus, and of the space they 
cover, can certainly benefit from a control analysis. In fact, in order to follow and monitor 
mobilities, the smart border is diffused along the very circuits where commodities and 
individuals circulate, constructing an apparatus that may follow individuals over multiple 
lines of displacement and verify their identities at various locations on those lines. Along 
various points of control, some mobilities may be interrupted (e.g. refugee claimants at 
the border); others may be simply surveyed through the analysis of the traveling records 
of airline passengers; still others may be further extended, for example by means of 
NEXUS preclearance cards delivered to truck drivers for easy passing of the Windsor-
Detroit Ambassador Bridge and to elite business travelers for skipping airports customs. 
Mobile bodies thus shape the space of the border along the lines traced by their 
displacements, but at the same time, these displacements are further influenced by their 
assessment by surveillance mechanisms as threatening or legitimated. Thus, the smart 
border control apparatus should be taken as a relational rather than totalizing mechanism 
which is located where its effects are felt. The “smartness” of the Canada-United States 
border thus comes from its capacity to relate to a set of technological mechanisms of 
control constantly re-inscribing the space of the diffuse border, bringing it into existence 
when and where security agencies suppose it to be necessary.     
 
Yet, it would be misleading to consider the diffuse border only through a control analysis.  
In fact, Deleuze (1990), as well as Walters (2006), do not discard the possibility that some 
old sovereign technologies and spaces of power re-emerge, showing themselves under a 
new face.7 In this sense, contemporary borders not only allow the performance of open-
ended types of surveillance, but also continue to operate as powerful instruments of 
institutional violence and policing (Balibar 2001). Consequently, if one can announce 
with Walters (2002) the 20th century demise of the Westphalian political imaginary which 
represented the border as a geopolitical locus of war and peace for European nations, it is 
important to recall that this imaginary has also arisen in relation to the colonial endeavour 
                                                     
7 “Il se peut que de vieux moyens, empruntés aux anciennes sociétés de souveraineté, reviennent sur scène, 
mais avec les adaptations necessaries” (Deleuze 1990: 246). (It is possible that old means, borrowed from 
former societies of sovereignty, become staged again, but with necessary adaptations). 
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and is sometimes mirrored in more contemporary border practices using confinement and 
the threat of violence by state authorities.   
 
Various works demonstrate the historical depth of Balibar’s insight. During the 19th 
century expansion of European sovereignty over colonial territories, traveling documents 
protected merchants and subjects of the metropole as well as guaranteed their access to 
colonial territories (Salter 2003). Meanwhile, new borders for Africa, North America and 
Australia were created via extra-territorial policing, colonial military deployments and, 
sometimes, private companies’ forces causing massive massacres of native populations 
and instigating the spoliation of aboriginal lands (Taussig 2005 [1984]; Arendt 1994 
[1951]). The securing of European expansion thus created a “colonial economy of 
violence” (Salter 2003: 21) in which Europe was concurrently constituted as a safe space.  
Furthermore, the management of mobility has been integral to the development of modern 
Euro-American states along a nation-race axis (Mongia 2003). The use of “remote control 
border” strategies, that is the pushing of border functions into foreign countries, already in 
use in the U.S. management of Chinese immigration as early as the beginning of the 20th 
century (Zolberg 1997), not only exemplifies this argument, but illustrates that the 
displacement of borders for containment purposes does not constitute an entirely new 
phenomenon. Therefore, the monopolization of the legitimate means of violence by 
Westphalian European states emerged in conjunction with the “legitimate means of 
movement” (Torpey 2000), that is the means through which one is authorized to move 
across spaces, employing borders as liminal spaces permitting forms of violence 
legitimated by state authorities.   
 
The recasting of the analysis of borders by taking into account their inscription in violent 
economic and political projects permits a different approach to contemporary apparatuses 
of power and the re-arranged exercise of state sovereignty. In fact, one might argue that 
what has recently changed in the use of borders are the ways in which they are now 
differentially employed as sites combining logics of control with sovereign measures. 
This combination is deemed to warrant “security” from a number of “threats” located 
outside as well as inside the borders of societies representing themselves as liberal and 
democratic. In order to do so, the smart border apparatus draws upon a variety of 
information technologies as well as multiple sites of confinement. These sites can be said 
to pertain to the smart border apparatus through various dispositions: by virtue of being 
included in counter-terrorism legislation and regulations, which are part of the Smart 
Border Declaration under points 28 and 29; through a reliance on the intelligence 
exchanged between Canada and United States—permitted by the fourth pillar of the 
Declaration “Information and Intelligence-sharing” and by the various sub-agreements 
signed under this pillar to permit such exchange for the arrest, interrogation, prosecution, 
detention or deportation of an individual; and, through the work of immigration officers in 
national and international airports and as a consequence of safe-third country agreements, 
which lead to the confinement of refugees and undocumented migrants in zones d’attente 
and immigration detention centres—points 5 and 12 of the Declaration’s action plan. 
 
These sites of confinement often operate under lower legal thresholds than those required 
by rule-of-law standards. This is the case for dispositions relating to the indefinite 
detention and house arrest for non-citizens under security certificates (Bell 2006; Larsen 
and Piché 2007), thus using immigration law as an anti-terrorism tool (Aiken 2007).  
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Confinement along the smart border also occurs through the incarceration of some 
citizens under anti-terrorism provisions and regulations, as well as through the extensive 
use of detention by United States immigration authorities for refugees refused at the 
Canadian border under the safe-third country agreement (Canadian Council for Refugees 
2005b). Finally, airports are locations employed for further interrogation and custody 
(Bahdi 2003) as well as deportation, sometimes in the form of extraordinary renditions 
towards countries practicing unlawful imprisonment and torture (Commission of Inquiry 
into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar 2006). Using such sites 
as border locations as per the dispositions of the Smart Border Declaration, state 
authorities aim at preventing certain individuals from accessing refugee protection in 
North America, and confining those whom they regard as security risks, while depriving 
them of their rights.   
 
Accordingly, in order to clearly understand the ways in which security operates in post 
9/11 North America, it may be important to revise arguments relating border surveillance 
to Deleuze’s notion of control. It is the articulation of control measures with the violence 
of sovereign techniques of government relying on the threat of incarceration, deportation 
and even torture, that characterizes the ways in which the “war on terror” is led at home.  
In turn, this threat—or its realization—is used to further implement control strategies and 
increase their effectiveness, sometimes even allowing for the extraction of information 
from surveyed or incarcerated persons about other individuals, who may, in turn, be 
subjected to intimidation by state authorities. Ultimately, the inclusion, in the action plan 
of the Smart Border Declaration, of counter-terrorism legislation and regulations, as well 
as the arrests and incarceration of citizens and permanent residents under charges of 
terrorism or under security certificates, point at the ways in which the smart border has 
been enrolled in the fight against terrorism through its diffusion inside the North 
American territory. This does not make the smart border apparatus the main driver of the 
counter-terrorism strategy in North America, as its purpose—stated in the Declaration—is 
rather to reinforce “public and economic security” and protect “the largest trading 
relationship in the world” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2001). Yet, while the 
Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act and Public Safety Act grant police and security services 
more power in the gathering of information (ICMLG 2004), it is the mechanisms of 
intelligence sharing agreed upon under various agreements related to the smart border that 
allow for this information to be circulated between Canada and the United States for the 
targeting of specific individuals. 
 
 
An intelligence paradigm 
 
The inclusion of spaces of confinement in the smart border could have been analysed by 
means of the now well-known works of Agamben on exception. Reading Carl Schmitt, 
Agamben analyzes the state of exception—established when the sovereign extracts itself 
from the realm of the law, and therefore, suspends its validity—as the “very meaning of 
state authority” and “the very condition of possibility of juridical rule” (1998: 17). As for 
the reviewed spaces of confinement, such exception works through legally empty spaces 
in which law and violence become indistinguishable. Thus, the sovereign includes in its 
centre a “dislocating localization” where the exception becomes the rule. In these sites, 
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the juridical subject, encountering the sovereign, is taken outside the framework of law, 
often through stripping her of the rights usually granted by citizenship. Yet, the use of the 
metaphor of the camp as the trope coinciding with these exceptional spaces in modern 
times, has been criticized, particularly by Ong (2006) who emphasizes its inapplicability 
to the new spatialization of sovereignty produced by the flows opened by neoliberal forms 
of government of capitalism.8 Thus, given the concern of state authorities with the 
surveillance of migrant mobilities partly unleashed by neoliberal capitalism and 
corresponding governing practices,9 Agamben’s  recent efforts to resituate his theory of 
exception become all the more pertinent. According to Agamben (2005), the sovereign 
capacity to declare the state of exception has currently been replaced by a “security 
paradigm” which rests upon the normalization of security powers operating as ordinary 
techniques of government. This argument can be amended.  In the case of the smart 
border, we are rather witnessing the emergence of an “intelligence paradigm” in which 
the diffusion of the border occurs beyond the various measures of control and spaces of 
confinement it deploys. In fact, the diffuse border also rests upon the national and 
international sharing of information by security agencies along circuits of information 
exchange.   
 
Information-sharing and accountability 
Various agreements signed under the Smart Border Declaration allow for the exchange of 
specific types of information such as passenger data and intelligence about travelers, 
migrants and citizens, usually exchanged without the knowledge of the persons about 
whom this information is gathered. As a result, much of the public debate around 
intelligence-sharing emphasizes the dangers of privacy intrusion that the gathering and 
storing of identification data for further use may represent (American Civil Liberties 
Union 2003). Yet, the problem seems to run much deeper. Intelligence-sharing also 
involves the cultivation of relationships between the liaison agents of different security 
agencies.  These individuals create networks in which the exchange of information 
becomes circular, involving data shared in bulk (Grey 2007). Such data-sharing is also 
characterized by the repetition of unverified information concerning individuals, even 
when a person’s name has been cleared.10 Thus, by virtue of being exchanged, repeated 
and circulated, the shared information acquires legitimacy by means of a self-
referentiality which stands for truth—as further illustrated by the well-publicized case of 
Maher Arar.    
 
                                                     
8 For the concentrated efforts of state authorities in the formation of such spaces through the 1980s and 
1990s via the deregulation of monetary and commodity exchanges, see the works of the French Regulation 
School, especially those of (Théret, 2000). 
9 Undocumented migration usually happens in order to seek asylum or work—or both.  On contemporary 
forms of structural violence, as well as their consequences over social and economic rights in a global era, 
see Farmer (2005). On structural adjustments and other neoliberal global economic policies of institutions 
such as International Monetary Fund, and their responsibility in creating major economic crises, please 
refer to the book of the former chief economist of the World Bank (Stieglitz 2003). 
10 As in the case of a Canadian-Somali business man who lost his business and reputation after having 
been wrongly included on a list for the freezing of terrorist assets, and who remained on the lists 
exchanged by banks and security agencies well after his categorization as a ‘terrorist’ had been removed 
(Bahdi 2003). 
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Furthermore, there is little accountability from the agencies that go about gathering and 
exchange data since intelligence-sharing between security agencies lacks public oversight 
mechanisms. The absence of transparency is a central feature of the intelligence 
paradigm; indeed, the information transmitted between security agencies and the 
processes through which threat is assessed remain, for the most part, unknown to the 
general public. This secrecy is mirrored on the judicial level where state lawyers are 
obtaining orders of non-publication in terrorism trials, as well as the non-disclosure of 
evidence in security certificate cases, justified under national security concerns. Thus, the 
data circulated between intelligence agencies on a daily basis, and the evidence collected 
against an individual accused under anti-terrorism provisions, is not submitted to external 
examination and is sometimes denied the test of law; instead, it is validated by the simple 
suspicion a security agency may have about a person. Consequently, the intelligence 
paradigm constituted by the smart border certainly illustrates Butler’s (2004) contention 
that the “war on terror” at home rests upon the arbitrariness of state authorities and the 
lack of structures of accountability that emerge from the normalization of the use of 
exceptionary powers.   
 
Suspicion and race 
The cultures of secrecy and suspicion inherent to surveillance mechanisms but reinforced 
after 9/11 (Lyon 2003a), influence the ways in which information is gathered, analyzed 
and validated.  In effect, the intelligence paradigm sanctions the characterization of 
individuals according to their deemed level of dangerousness. To quote Butler, deeming 
remains a peculiar process which rests on “an unsubstantiated judgment that … works to 
pre-empt determinations for which evidence is required” (2004: 76). Such assessment 
brings someone beyond the realm of law into the technological domain of the smart 
border apparatus where security agencies test dangerousness by means of the information 
contained in their databases. The dangerous objects hence fashioned are evaluated 
through elaborate categorizations of risk for the establishment of risk profiles. Therefore, 
danger is assessed through calculated distinctions based on physical descriptions, 
attributed religion, citizenship statuses and immigration history.11 Refugees and 
undocumented migrants, as well as Muslims or those perceived to be “Middle Eastern, 
Arab or Muslim” (Volpp 2002) are cast as potential threats to national security.   
 
As Pratt (1999) reminds us in the case of immigration enforcement agents, attention 
should be paid to the ways in which the discretionary powers with which security 
agencies are endowed, constitute a form of governance which facilitates the translation of 
societal anxieties into exclusionary practices. Consequently, the assessment of danger 
through risk management authorizes the repetition and circulation of stereotypes, and 
confers truth-value upon them because they are enunciated by agencies granted with the 
authority to designate what constitutes threat in the smart border apparatus. Working in 
conjunction with what Ahmed (2004) describes as metonymies inserted in economies of 
fear (for instance, “refugee” standing for “porous borders”), the stereotypical repetition 
establishes a causal relationship between terms such as “Muslim” or “Arab” or “refugee” 
with terrorism, criminality and insecurity. Transformed into racial signifiers, these objects 
are essentialized as dangers, then carefully managed and distributed using risk as a 
                                                     
11 As Dean (1999) reminds us, risk is a rationality which ultimately aims at rendering the social in a 
calculable form for its reordering. 
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hierarchizing criteria. This crystallisation of difference according to stereotypes combined 
with the categorization and hierarchization of human beings through risk management, 
are essential operations of racism, as Guillaumin (2002 [1972]) has demonstrated. To 
parapharase Balibar (1988: 75), in the intelligence paradigm, immigration  becomes “the 
name of race par excellence”. 
 
Consequently, the securitization of the border feeds upon societal anxieties about refugees 
and undocumented migrants, as well as articulates itself to the racism currently directed 
towards Muslims in North America. Keeping with a tendency in which Western countries 
increasingly problematized refugees as “objects of fear” (Whitaker 1998), refugees and 
undocumented migrants became an object of anxious attention in Canada in the 1990s, 
criminalized on the one hand (Pratt and Valverde 2002) and contained, on the other, 
through implementing various measures intended to keep them away from Canadian 
borders (Canadian Council for Refugees 1998; Crépeau 1995). Meanwhile, the media 
circulate a flourishing of stereotypical images about Islam (Jiwani 2006), among other 
means through the publication of an abundance of orientalist books adopting a “clash of 
civilization” stance (Razack 2006). Also appropriating the language of feminism by 
depicting Muslim men as brutal fanatics and Muslim women as their eternal victims, 
these essentializing discourses feed the North American politics of war-mongering in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (Abu-Lughod 2002; Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002), but also the resort 
to security measures against Muslims.12   
 
Therefore, I concur with Amoore’s (2006) brilliant contention that by using biometrics or 
creating programmes such as the Smart Border Declaration, states are performing the 
“idea” of the border as a portable border transported by mobile bodies. However, I would 
also insist on the racial aspects involved in such performativity, that is the programme, as 
well as its implantation in the apparatus, racializes these bodies through the use of various 
mechanisms of othering such as risk management. Perhaps the spatial diffusion of the 
smart border sheds light on the ways in which North American states actualize their 
authority through the tracing of racialized “epistemic frontiers” (Mignolo and Tlostanova 
2006). This reaction to migration movements, together with the Muslim and Arab 
presence within North American societies, brings about a form of racism centered on the 
maintenance of naturalized cultural boundaries. This process makes use, among other 
things, of border mechanisms as spaces rendering the smoothening of the movements of 
privileged persons and commodities, and is dependent upon the containment and 
surveillance of racialized others. The following sections intend to illustrate the workings 
                                                     
12 An analysis of such racist context would point at its potential for the generation of resentment, suspicion 
as well as disaffection towards economic, political and media institutions, which may in turn feed an 
attraction towards more radical forms of dissent and conservative identity formations.  It may be worth it 
to quote Benhabib at length on this issue: ‘If we want to understand why so many educated, relatively 
well-off Muslim males who had lived in Hamburg and Paris would participate in the actions of September 
11, we have to understand the psychology of Muslim immigrants in their encounters with secular liberal 
democracies of the West. Given the failure of their own home-grown versions of modernity like Nasserism 
and the Ba’ath movement, given the global entertainment industry’s profound assault on their identity as 
Muslims, and given the profound discrimination and contempt which they experience in their host 
societies as new immigrants who are perceived to have ‘backward’ morals and ways of life, many young 
Muslims today turn to Islamism and fundamentalism’ (2002 44). 
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of this politics of mobility, first by offering a few genealogical elements about the making 
of the smart border, and secondly, through a focus on the measures diffusing the smart 
border and constituting an intelligence paradigm.   
 
 
Some elements for a genealogical sketch of border transformations 
 
The smart border stems from a recent genealogy. In the wake of globalization tendencies 
which threatened the place of the United place within international markets (Deblock and 
Rioux 1993), free trade agreements were signed between Canada and the United States in 
1988, and then with Mexico in 1994 with the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). With the central aim of eliminating impediments to trade (Government of 
Canada 1989), the loosening of border control on exchanges of commodities constituted 
the border as a space of economic mobility and market exchanges (Pellerin 2004). In that 
decade, North American governments experimented with their first preclearance lanes 
(Sparke 2004), and worked on pilot projects such as NEXUS which tested more 
technological forms of preclearance passes. Thus the dominant narrative and construction 
of the border privileged its porousness and fluidity, in line with neoliberal discourses 
emphasizing the opening of borders to trade. However, new circulating objects emerged 
out of this “space of flows” (Castells 1997), objects that increasingly came to be 
represented as problems. 
 
In fact, NAFTA was followed in 1995 by a minor agreement which went unnoticed, the 
Canada-United States Accord on Our Shared Borders (Canadian Border Services Agency 
2000).13 Primarily addressing the facilitation of economic flows, this agreement 
nevertheless pointed to some changes in the ways in which the 49th parallel was to be 
managed for reasons related to but partly departing from an economic logic. North 
American security agencies embarked in the redefinition of post-cold war threats, as did 
European police forces (Bigo 1996), thus slowly reworking the meaning given to security.  
Following that trend, the agreement portrayed the signatories as facing “external threats 
related to international terrorism, transnational crime, and drug and people smuggling” 
and endeavoured to coordinate immigration, custom and intelligence agencies in order to 
confront those threats. In this logic, the Canada-United States Border Crime Forum as 
well as the USINS/CIC Border Vision were implemented in 1997 as joint regional 
approaches to the management of international organized crime and migration, 
respectively. Yet, this re-defined security was not understood as a priority but as “shared 
problems” along the “world's longest undefended border.” The publication of the 2000 
update by the Minister of Public Works and Government Services reveals this technical 
character of a programme primarily set for the improvement of border facilities and the 
lessening of hindrances to border crossing.   
 
The days following the 9/11 strikes brought major changes in border management. The 
circulation of commodities and persons along the second busiest border in the world 
encountered serious difficulties (Andreas 2003). Uncommonly long waiting times awaited 
                                                     
13 The text of this accord seems rather short and considered of minor importance by both governments as 
it does not figure in any governmental archive and is therefore difficult to obtain. Only the 2000 update is 
available. 
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air travelers, endless queues of drivers formed at border posts,14 various programs of 
admission of refugees and immigrants in both countries encountered deferral, and a few 
months later, 600 soldiers of the National Guard were added on the United States side of 
the border (Cornellier 2001). Meanwhile, United States authorities, followed by the 
media, presented the border as dangerously porous to exterior threats and Canada as a 
safe haven for terrorists. From being the site of a friendly binational relationship, the 
Canada-United States border became, over a few weeks, a significant security concern. 
The United States scandal about alleged “terrorists” who would have crossed the border 
towards Canada in December 2002 quickly proved to be a hoax yet it revealed the 
repositioning of the discourse about the border. The open letter addressed by Denis 
Coderre, then minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), to the Canadian 
news editors, condemning what he saw as a climate of fear-mongering around this story, 
sheds light on the reconfiguration of the border as a security matter for governmental 
authorities during that period. On the one hand, the minister emphasized the extent of 
governmental efforts since 2001 in constituting and implementing a variety of measures 
dedicated to the securitization of the border which illustrates that the securitization of the 
border was gaining importance by becoming a public matter. On the other hand, the fact 
that border issues was under the jurisdiction of the minister of immigration is a sign that 
border management had shifted from a merely economic concern. Indeed, having been a 
responsibility of the Department of Trades and of Public Works in the 1990s, the border 
became a matter for the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in 2002, to be 
transferred in 2003 to a new independent border agency—the Canadian Border Services 
Agency—itself under the responsibility of the new Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness Department, Canada’s equivalent of the United States’ “Homeland 
Security”. It is in this context that the Smart Border Declaration was signed.  
 
 
From Bogotá to Toronto: diffusing the border 
 
Setting a programme for the reorganization of the space of the border, the Declaration and 
its action plan reveal a profound transformation in the ways in which state authorities 
conceptualize its location. A close analysis of the measures which followed the signature 
of the agreement, point to the ways in which these mechanisms were put in practice, 
diffusing the smart border apparatus beyond and inside the 49th parallel. 
 
Before and on the border 
Once conceptualized as a single checkpoint where every traveler is examined upon arrival 
and departure, the border has been fragmented into a multiplicity of control points 
covering travel routes leading to North America. To explain this shift, the preamble to the 
Statement of Mutual Understanding on Information Sharing—signed in 2003 under point 
4 of the action plan—states: 
 
Canada and the United States are pursuing a regional approach to migration based on the 
Multiple Borders Strategy.  The Multiple Borders Strategy views the border not as a geo-
                                                     
14 The waiting time at the border in the days after the attacks went from 1-2 minutes to 10 to 15 hours.  
Some plants on both sides of the border were forced to temporarily suspend their operations, lacking the 
materials to resume production (Andreas 2003). 
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political line but rather a continuum of checkpoints along a route of travel from the 
country of origin to Canada or the United States.  At every checkpoint along the travel 
continuum—visa screening; airport check-in; points of embarkation; transit points; 
international airports and seaports; and the Canada-United States border—there is an 
opportunity for the Participants to link the person and the document and any known 
intelligence (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2003b). 
 
This distancing of the border from its geopolitical location is intended to intercept “high 
risk” travelers prior to their arrival in North America. To this effect, the Smart Border 
Declaration states: “We will identify security threats before they arrive in North America 
through collaborative approaches to reviewing crew and passenger manifests, managing 
refugees, and visa policy coordination”. The action plan lists the measures implementing 
this displacement of the border beyond its geopolitical location, including a common visa 
policy, the sharing of “look-out lists at visa issuing offices,” the use of “migration 
integrity officers” in international airports—mandated to prohibit the passage of 
improperly documented travelers—and training airline personnel in recognizing irregular 
documentation. Both countries have agreed to pursue this matter and to coordinate their 
overseas immigration officers by March 2007, as part of the Security and Prosperity 
Partnership (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada 2006).   
 
Despite the extension of the border, the geopolitical border remains a site where the 
containment of refugees takes place. Signed under the smart border action plan’s fifth 
point and implemented in December 2004, the “safe third country agreement” recognizes 
Canada and the United States as secure countries for refugees to claim asylum, thus 
permitting the sending back of refugees who cross their land border, to the last country of 
presence.15 Given the current migratory and flight patterns in North America, this 
agreement is tantamount to the refoulement of refugees to the south of the border by 
Canadian authorities.16 In the United States, refugees face widespread detention, new 
restrictive refugee laws such as the 2005 Real ID Act and an increased number of 
expedited deportations.17 The effects for the admission of refugees in Canada are 
daunting, especially for the most affected group, Colombian asylum seekers. The number 
of refugee claims by Columbians in 2005—who mainly used to claim asylum in Canada 
from the land border—, was only 30 per cent of that of the previous year (Canadian 
Council for Refugees 2005b). Since claiming refugee status in both countries has become 
increasingly difficult, various organizations suggest that refugees opt to remain 
                                                     
15 Exempted from this agreement in Canada are: those who can prove they have relatives with status in 
Canada, unaccompanied minors, convicts subject to death penalty, persons with valid visas or from a 
moratorium country—that is to which deportation is on hold for it is considered to be under unrest (the list, 
last reviewed in October 2006, includes Afghanistan, Burundi, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Rwanda and Zimbabwe). 
16 Non-refoulement, or the prohibition to send refugees back to persecution, remains the chief principle of 
the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
17 The United States Real ID act restricts refugee protection in a number of ways, such as a requirement 
for providing documentary evidence of persecution. This represents a bureaucratic obligation hard to 
fulfill for refugees coming from countries with impoverished state apparatuses, or from regions or 
minority groups receiving little public attention. For more information on the Real ID act, please refer to 
Amnesty International USA (2005) and the Canadian Council for Refugees (2005b). 
 
Côté-Boucher: Canada’s Smart Border 
Surveillance & Society 5(2) 
 
155
underground, that is illegally, in greater numbers (Harvard Law Students Advocates for 
Human Rights et al. 2006). Consequently, measures such as the safe-third country 
agreement produce the “discursive disappearance of refugees” (Macklin 2005). As 
mentioned above, this capacity to speak of certain objects and in particular ways, while 
dismissing other designations or approaches, is one of the most important features of the 
apparatus. In the smart border apparatus, refugees are spoken of only as potential threats; 
as a result, while various measures spread out along the smart border concur in 
criminalizing refugees, the actual need for asylum of numbers of people is negated.  
Containment thus transforms refugees and undocumented migrants into “illegals” forced 
to take smuggling routes and remain underground once their destination is reached, 
thereby removing them from the public eye and the bounds of law. These smart border 
initiatives may be seen as a mere continuation of refugee interdiction, the panoply of 
measures for the refoulement of refugees developed in the 1980s and rendered common in 
the 1990s in North America and Europe (Whitaker 2002). Yet, signed at the onset of the 
“war on terror”, the Smart Border Declaration, as well as the 2005 Security and 
Prosperity Partnership, commits Canada and the United States to stop individuals who 
could “pose security concerns” before they land in North America. The agreement thus 
innovates by both discursively and practically recasting refugee interdiction and the 
containment of undocumented migrants as an anti-terrorism endeavour. Arguably, one 
may correctly speak of refugees and undocumented migrants as “the unexpected victims 
of 11 September 2001” (Guild 2003).  
 
The border within 
The smart border apparatus does not end at the 49th parallel, but penetrates and extends 
well into the Canadian territory in order to survey other populations considered to 
represent a security menace. To this end, the smart border includes parts of the counter-
terrorism legal framework, using anti-terrorism at home as a border measure. In effect, 
points 28 and 29 of the declaration’s action plan insist on the implementation of a 
counter-terrorism legislation, especially by means of a set of legal provisions related to 
the freezing of terrorist assets as well as regulations regarding “the designation of terrorist 
organizations.” This is ensured in Canada by means of the listing by intelligence agencies 
of “terrorist entities,” of which membership is criminalized under the Anti-Terrorism Act 
adopted by Parliament in October 2001. Of the currently 40 listed organizations, the 
majority (28) are armed groups designated by intelligence agencies as “Islamic 
extremists”, fighting in areas and countries such as Palestine, Lebanon, Kurdistan, 
Afghanistan, southern Philippines and Algeria (Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness 2006). It is important to remember that before 2001, Canada had no legal 
definition of terrorism, which, according to Aiken (2000), granted authorities great 
discretionary power to refuse refugees on security grounds, or to sign security certificates 
(see below). Since a definition of terrorism, although contested in courts, has now been 
included in the Anti-Terrorism Act, the designation by intelligence agencies of a “terrorist 
organization” has to be coherent with that definition (Department of the Solicitor General 
of Canada 2002). Again, the apparatus makes visible certain objects such as specific 
fighting groups, designating them as “terrorists” which, in turn, allows for their inclusion 
in a discourse of securitization institutionalized in a set of laws. Any social actor wishing 
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to contest this designation within the apparatus now has to struggle with its inclusion in 
the legislation.18      
 
As Davis (2001) recalls, the term “entity” in the denomination “terrorist entity” may also 
designate a person. Accordingly, citizens have experienced the consequences of the ATA 
provisions as a denial of their basic rights, often impeded by “national security” 
requirements concerning their cases. Accused of terrorist conspiracy under the anti-
terrorism act, 17 young Muslim men in Toronto were arrested on June 2-3, 2006 (CBC, 
2006). The circumstances leading to their arrest are unclear since the case stands before 
the courts under an order of non-publication, as is also the case for the trial of Mohammad 
Momin Khawaja, the first person charged under anti-terrorism provisions in March 2004. 
The lack of transparency characteristic of those trials is mirrored by other cases pertaining 
to the Canadian anti-terrorism endeavour. In fact, less than two weeks after the arrests, on 
June 13-14, an appeal about the constitutionality of security certificates was heard by the 
Supreme Court.19   
 
Security certificates trials are based on undisclosed evidence, which seriously impedes 
cross-examination by the legal counsel of the defendants; the process rather relies upon 
the ability of judges to establish the credibility of the evidence before them. 
Consequently, those trials are not based upon disclosed and validated facts, but upon their 
likelihood, thereby denying elementary constitutional rights normally granted to those 
prosecuted in Canada (Bell 2006). Currently, five non-citizens, all Muslim men, are under 
security certificates in Canada. Fighting their deportation while indefinitely detained, 
three of them, Mohamed Harkat and Adil Charkaoui and Mohammad Mahjoub now 
remain under extremely restrained conditions tantamount to house arrest. Hassan Almrei, 
Mahmoud Jaballah and Mahjoub, before his release, have been pursuing a second hunger 
strike between December 2006 and February 2007, protesting against their detention 
conditions. Of the 27 certificates issued by the Canadian state since 1991 (Amnesty 
International, 2006a), 20 of the certificates concerned Muslim or Arab men and women 
(The Gazette 2003). This targeting and indefinite detention of Arabs and Muslims brought 
the Canadian Arab Federation and the legal representatives of Almrei to maintain, during 
the spring 2006 Supreme Court challenge to the security certificate, that these were 
tantamount to racial profiling.20 The Supreme Court, in its February 2007 judgment, has 
                                                     
18 For the amendment to the Canadian Criminal Code by the Anti-Terrorism Act, particularly regarding the 
definition of terrorism, see the text of the bill at: 
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=1&Mode=1&Pu
b=Bill&Doc=C-36_4&File=39#5 (last accessed 7 June 2007).  The definition of a terrorist act or omission 
committed “in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause” has 
been the object of legal debate, as attested by the decision of a judge from the Ontario Superior Court who 
declared this part of the definition unconstitutional (Alex Dobrota and Galloway 2006). 
19 Security certificates are part of the immigration legislation and mainly serve a pre-emptive purpose; 
they can be issued by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and the Minister of Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness, if intelligence services have reasonable grounds to believe a non-citizen could 
present a security or a serious criminal threat in the past, the present, or the future.  Such broad definition 
of security, together with the terrorism definition, allows for the detention and eventual deportation of an 
individual even when this person is not considered to constitute an ‘actual security risk’ (Canadian Council 
for Refugees 2005a). 
20 On June 13 and 14, 2006, the author attended the Supreme Court hearings on security certificates in 
Ottawa. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2007) had similar 
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struck down certain provisions of the legislation, especially those having to do with the 
non-disclosure of evidence, and has given one year to the federal authorities to present an 
alternative to the current certificates.21 
 
The Toronto arrests and the use of secret evidence in the cases of security certificates, 
point to the increasing role of security agencies in the constitution of an intelligence 
paradigm through the exchange of information. This role requires attention, as it appears 
central to the diffusion of the border apparatus. 
 
 
Transforming the means of movement through intelligence-sharing  
 
Border identification procedures have long relied on “means of movement” such as 
passports, visas and identity cards, as a way to differentiate foreigners from nationals and 
produce their mobility as legal or illegal (Torpey 2000). The smart border apparatus still 
relies upon a series of documents for the control of mobilities, such as visas for travelers 
coming from South America, Asia as well as Africa and the Middle East (Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada 2007). Yet, the identification of travelers has moved beyond from 
the sole use of paperwork and passport stamps. Various technologies now computerize 
documents, such as the Canadian permanent resident card, potentially including pages of 
data about their bearer (Browne 2005). Other modified documents emerge, for instance 
NEXUS preclearance cards which include biometric elements such as photograph, 
fingerprints and iris imprints, thereby transforming the crossing of border posts for 
frequent “trusted” travelers into a mere technical formality, efficiently and rapidly 
performed (Canada Border Services Agency 2007). An important literature examines the 
“politics of biometrics” (Muller 2005) produced by the inclusion of unique bodily features 
in travelling documents which generates new forms of embodiment (van der Ploeg 2006) 
and a novel government of mobilities (Zureik 2004; Amoore 2006). In this technological 
transformation of the means of movement, documents remain crucial, yet only in two 
aspects: first they reveal information that can be reproduced, exchanged as well as 
compared to data already compiled into databases; secondly, they contain data that is 
unique and deemed protected against forgery, such as biometrics. In the case of the smart 
border apparatus, it is necessary to go beyond the important analysis of the 
“informatization of the body” through biometrics (van der Ploeg 2003) in order to 
examine the constitution of an intelligence paradigm in which the informatization of 
travel documents permits the exchange of the data they enclose.   
 
The Statement of Mutual Understanding on Information Sharing 
The constitution of an intelligence paradigm through the diffuse smart border can be 
illustrated by analyzing the sharing of various types of information; for instance, the 
exchange of PNR/API information between private airlines and state authorities has been 
well described by Bennett (2005). Yet, the circulation of travelers” information has 
generally received more public attention by organizations preoccupied with issues of 
                                                                                                                                                               
concerns in a March 2007 report, not only regarding security certificates but also concerning the 
implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act. 
21 The full text of the judgment, Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2007, SCC9, is 
available at: http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2007/2007scc9/2007scc9.html (last accessed 7 June 2007). 
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privacy than a little known agreement which provides for the exchange of information 
concerning foreigners, immigrants and refugees. Signed in February 2003 under point 4 
of the smart border action plan, The Statement of Mutual Understanding on Information 
Sharing (SMU) stipulates 30 categories of information—see Table 1—about an individual 
that security services of both countries may exchange but are not limited to, including: 
citizenship (e.g. country of birth and status), identity (including biometrics and physical 
description), immigration and security history (e.g. links with terrorist and criminal 
organization, previous immigration violation), travel history and documentation as well as 
personal history (e.g. education, marital status, addresses, work history) (Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada 2003b). In this instance, the list of categories relies on more specific 
information than API/PNR data, since it is intended to portray the life story of the 
individual, as well as to potentially provide for a racialized identification through 
categories such as physical description. Furthermore, merging immigration enforcement 
and criminal history as central elements of an immigrant’s life, the SMU establishes 
migration as a specific category of human displacement which ought to be considered as a 
potential threat to North American countries.   
 
The enunciation of statements casting immigration as a danger extends to those seeking 
asylum. According to the annex to the SMU, four categories of information may be 
exchanged between the two countries: “information related to the identity of refugees,” 
“information relating to the processing of the refugee status claim,” “information relevant 
to a decision to deny a refugee status claimant access to the refugee determination 
system,” and finally, “information regarding the substance or history of any previous 
refugee status claim” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2003a). The phrasing of each 
category of information indicates the purpose of such agreement, namely restricting and 
denying access to the refugee systems of both countries. In contrast to the provisions of 
the SMU, its annex provides for a systematic sharing of information about refugee 
claimants on a periodic basis. For instance, the mandatory front-end screening of refugees 
in Canada requires digital fingerprinting, photographs and biographical information that 
are systematically compared to U.S. immigration and FBI databases. Consequently, the 
Asylum Annex contributes to further interdicting refugees by targeting those who managed 
to reach North American borders, casting asylum seekers as one of the highest security 
threats to the region.   
 
Surveyed migrants and refugees interdicted by means of intelligence sharing have little 
say in contesting the type of information transmitted on their personal histories. The 
national inquiry into the case of Maher Arar, who holds dual Canadian-Syrian citizenship, 
has publicly demonstrated the consequences of the constitution of an intelligence 
paradigm on immigrants, even for those who are citizens. Being surveyed as a person of 
interest in a wider anti-terrorism investigation, Arar, as well as his wife Monia Mazigh, 
were placed under a border “terrorism” lookout by Canadian custom services in October 
2001. His file was handed over by the federal police, the RCMP, to United States 
authorities. This file described Arar and Mazigh as “Islamic extremist individuals 
suspected of being linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist movement” (Commission of Inquiry 
into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar 2006: 20-21). In transit 
in the United States in September 2002 on his way back from an overseas trip, Arar was 
intercepted by U.S. border officials who, shortly after, received from Canadian 
intelligence sources a list of questions to be asked to Arar. Detained for a few days, he 
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was then sent by United States border authorities to Syria, where he was jailed for one 
year. His statement extracted under torture was later used by Canadian security services to 
continue their investigation, as well as to publicly discredit him upon his return.  
Meanwhile, three other Muslim Canadians, Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad El Maati and 
Muayyed Nureddin have been recognized as having suffered the same treatment as Maher 
Arar.22 The Arar Commission (2006: 15) has also established that the Canadian 
intelligence services sent questions to the Syrian Military Intelligence to be used in the 
interrogation of Almalki. 
 
Of course, collaboration with United States in extraordinary renditions for “the 
outsourcing of torture” is not peculiar to Canada (Amnesty International 2006b), but the 
Commission offered interesting conclusions. It exonerated Maher Arar, but also revealed 
the everyday processes through which Canadian security services exchange information 
with United States intelligence agencies. It also pointed to the limited public oversight to 
which Canadian security agencies are submitted in the gathering and diffusion of 
information. Furthermore, it uncovered a disturbing practice of intelligence-sharing with 
states that routinely engage in torture such as Syria, and the disquieting propensity by 
Canadian security agencies to consider valid the evidence produced under torture.   
 
However, in its final report, the Arar Commission uncritically recognizes the role of the 
border as a space allowing for further investigation of citizens and non-citizens: “There is 
a reduced expectation of privacy at the border when any person is entering Canada, and 
secondary examinations are frequently conducted where search warrants cannot be 
obtained” (2006: 19). The Commission fell short of radically questioning the use of the 
border as a site of blurred legal status which impedes the rights of individuals when they 
are investigated by security agencies. It is unlikely that the institutional culture of 
intelligence agencies coupled with such an understanding of security will change in the 
short term. Indeed,  Canada and United States have agreed under the Security and 
Prosperity Partnership to “enhance the international liaison officer network to facilitate 
intelligence sharing and analysis,” as well as to share “terrorist watchlist data” (Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade Canada 2006).   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As it articulates the surveillance of mobilities and of specific populations to a diffuse 
space of control, the smart border eradicates the border as we knew it. In fact, North 
American authorities are regrouping scattered measures which they have experimented 
with over the last decade; accordingly, those previously discrete apparatuses constituted 
at the global and the local level are now intertwined (Lyon 2003a) in the smart border.  
Combining control measures with incarceration and having relied on the use of violence 
towards those confined abroad to gather information, the smart border deploys a variety 
of technologies of power. This article has attempted to shed some light upon the scope of 
its reach as well as its complexity. 
 
                                                     
22 An in camera investigation is under way in their cases, with a report to be published at the beginning of 
2008. 
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Being deterritorialized and reterritorialized beyond and inside its geopolitical location, the 
effects of the diffuse border are hence felt in a multiplicity of cases, from the 
Zimbabwean asylum seeker refused a visa and the Columbian refugee prevented from 
crossing Canada’s land border, to the Moroccan permanent resident required to spy on his 
Montreal community on behalf of Canadian intelligence agencies, in exchange for 
citizenship or other privileges.23 In addition, the smart border brings about a 
reconfiguration of the means of movement, increasingly relying on the exchange of 
information about travelers, migrants and citizens. A new spatialization of the border is 
therefore under way, diffusing it territorially through a variety of checkpoints and 
confinement spaces, but also locating the border into the virtual realm of databases. It is 
this phenomenon of computerization of the border that permits the emergence of an 
intelligence paradigm in which secrecy and a lack of accountability of security agency 
accompany a suspicion habitus closely enmeshed with contemporary racialized discourses 
and anxieties. 
 
The smart border capacity to generate objects is thus intertwined with what Ahmed 
(2004) designates as an economy of fear. Therefore, the border apparatus is deployed 
through a set of mechanisms of othering resulting in concrete and permanent effects 
experienced by those it surveys. On the one hand, whereas asylum seekers are designated 
in the smart border apparatus as potential terrorists or as threats indicative of the 
porousness of the border, refugee admissions are plummeting while non-citizens are 
treated as if they were continuously situated at the border (Canadian Council for Refugees 
2001, also cited in Aiken 2007). On the other hand, the surveillance of Muslims, citizens 
as well as non-citizens, has also turned into a border measure. While the designation of 
“terrorist entities” is metonymically equated to being or “appearing” Muslim, Arab or 
Middle Eastern, various testimonies from North American Arabs and Muslims bear 
witness to the feelings generated by such categorization, expressed as a sense of 
“psychological internment” (Siddiqui 2006) reaching well beyond the incarceration of 
some, and the extraordinary rendition of others. By producing and recasting various 
groups as potential threats to the Canadian body politic, the smart border apparatus re-
inscribes what it means to be Canadian; as a consequence of border securitization a novel 
politics of belonging is therefore emerging, a politics to which researchers will have to 
pay close attention. 
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